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NAFrA

-

THE BROAD STROKES: A CANADIAN

LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE
Lawrence L. Herman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Because Canada is a country heavily dependent on trade - and
much of it with the United States - there is a wide-spread sensitivity
to the impact of bilateral (and multilateral) trade rules on Canadian
interests; commercial, cultural, and political. It is interesting to compare
the current situation with that of a decade or so ago, when trade policy
and law was considered an esoteric subject and almost nobody apart
from the cognoscenti paid much attention to the arcane deliberations of
the GATT in Geneva. Today in Canada the GATT, the WTO, and the
NAFTA are part of the business jargon. Canadians are talking the
NAFTA talk.
This focus is partly the result of the globalization of business and
the impact of multilateral rules and rule-making on international commerce. Heightened public awareness of trade law in Canada is reflective
of a variety of new trade-liberalizing rules that affect Canadian commerce in a direct way. Similarly, the impact of NAFTA and of WTO
dispute settlement panels on Canadian laws and policies has now become imbedded in public consciousness. A'trio of major trade disputes
with the United States in the fields of softwood lumber, agricultural
tariffs, and Canadian taxes on periodicals has brought this to the fore
recently and gained for the NAFTA and the WTO an unprecedented
prominence in public debate and media reporting.
An interesting aspect of this phenomenon is the remarkable contrast
in attitudes and perceptions between Canada and the United States insofar as the NAFTA is concerned. In addressing the "broad strokes" of the
NAFTA -

avoiding a technical, dry, legal discussion

-

two items are

examined that bring out these differences. The first is the NAFTA dispute settlement process itself and the contrasting views about the merits

Lawrence L. Herman is Associate Counsel at the law firm of Cassels, Brock & Blackwell
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of that process on each side of the Canada-U.S. border, the second
concerns anti-dumping remedies and the differences in public attitudes
and private sector approaches in the two countries.
Considering the NAFrA dispute settlement system first, this Article
looks at the growing number of negative references being voiced in
legal and political circles in the United States. At the end, it suggests
how some steps might help to alleviate these concerns and, at the same
time, help to fill a legal vacuum at the centre of the NAFrA. Regarding
the second item, the use of anti-dumping remedies, the Article enters
into some discussion of this recurring problem in Canada-U.S. trade.
While this is a "broad strokes" Article, some suggestions are offered for
ameliorating the more egregious aspects of the anti-dumping system
through a NAFTA-inspired procedure that would test the "legitimacy" of
an anti-dumping action in the context of North American business reality.
This does not mean that Mexico has been forgotten in the equation.
It is only because much of the discussion in Canada is geared to what
takes place in the United States and because the vast bulk of intraNAFrA trade, as far as Canada is concerned, is with the United States.
This Article concentrates on the Canada-U.S. issues.
II. DIsPuTE SETrLEMENT UNDER THE NAFrA
A.

The Softwood Lumber Legacy

It is not the intention of this Article to review the Softwood Lumber
case in any detail. This has been done in abundance elsewhere.' However, for the sake of understanding, the following is a brief summary.
At the core are different views in Canada and the United States of
the concept of the term "subsidy." From the perspective of many in
Canada (not all, it should be emphasized, and it is a generalization to
speak of a "Canadian" view), it was inconceivable a few years ago that
Canadian provincial stumpage programs could be fitted within the definition of the term. In Lumber I in 1983, the Commerce Department
agreed and said that under U.S. law at that time stumpage was not
countervailable because it was generally available to all within the sector
that wished to acquire timber.2 Canadian producers sighed relief. The
' See, e.g., C.M. Gastle & J.G. Castel, Should the North American Dispute Settlement
Mechanism in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Cases be Reformed in Light of Softwood
Lumber III?, in LAW AND POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BuSINESS 821 (1995).
2 Final Negative Countervailing Duty Determinations; Certain Softwood Productsfrom Can-
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decision seemed to make good sense and comport with Tokyo Round

notions of the concept of subsidy - that is, a grant or money payment
or some other form of financial contribution, directly or indirectly, to a
specific enterprize or industry, as opposed to a government facility or
measure that was sector-wide and in the nature of a licence or provision

of access by way of rent?
4 and the rules on specificity
Then came Cabot Corporation,
changed.' Lumber II began. This time, based on substantially the same

facts, provincial stumpage programs were found to be countervailable by
the Commerce Department.6 The case was settled prior to final determi-

nation by way of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the
Canadian and U.S. governments, dated December 30, 1986. The MOU

envisaged increases in provincial rates and, pending those increases,
Canada agreed to apply a fifteen percent export tax on softwood exports
to discount the effect of the lower stumpage rate.7
The MOU was terminated by Canada in October, 1991, in accor-

dance with its terms, as a result of progressive increases in provincial
stumpage rates since 1986. The Canadian government considered that
because of these increases, the MOU no longer served its purpose.8

ada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159 (May 31, 1983). The Department determined that Canadian stumpage
programs did not confer a subsidy within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930
because they were not provided to a specific enterprize or industry and because any limitation on
the use of the stumpage programs was due to the inherent nature of the product and not to governmental activities.
There had been no GATr consensus on the precise meaning of the term "subsidy" as
concluded in the Report of the Working Party on Subsidies, Operation of the Provisions of Article XVI, adopted 21 Nov. 1961 (BLS.D. 10S/201) but the deliberations of the Working Party
suggest that it was actual payments or measures "having equivalent effect" that fell within the
provisions of Article XVI. There is no suggestion in the various Working Party documents that
any provision of a service or good by a government (such as roads, waterways, harbours, paid
access to resources such as timber, or medicare) was considered to be within the definition of
the term.
I Cabot Corp. v. United States, 620 F. Supp. 722 (Court of Int'l Trade, 1985).
5 Preferentiality Appendix to Preliminary Review, Carbon Black from Mexico, 51 Fed. Reg.
13,269 (Apr. 18, 1986). In its preliminary determination in Lumber 11, Commerce referred to
Cabot Corporation and to the "evolution of the Department's interpretation of countervailing duty
law" and the need to develop the specificity test "through experience in actual cases." 51 Fed.
Reg. 37, 455-56 (Oct. 22, 1986).
6 Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber
Productsfrom Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 (1986).
" Pursuant to the MOU, CQrmada enacted the Softwood Lumber Products Export Charge Act,
S.C. 1987, c. 15, under which all softwood lumber exports of the type covered by the MOU
were subject to a federal export tax at the time of export.
Clause 5 of the MOU provided that the export charge may be reduced or eliminated on
the basis of increased stumpage charges. Given these increases in the five-year period of the
MOU, the Canadian government informed the U.S. government of its intention to terminate the
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Following termination,, under pressure from U.S. interest groups and
influential members of the Congress, the U.S. government self-initiated a
countervailing duty investigation in Lumber III which resulted in subsidies being found, not only for stumpage, but also for log export restrictions in British Columbia." It was this part of the Commerce
Department's final determination in Lumber II that went the full route of
NAFTA panels," right through to an Extraordinary Challenge procedure
under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA." It is the result of that case and the
dissenting views of U.S. Judge Malcolm Wilkey that, in large measure,
have engendered current American dissatisfaction with the NAFTA and,
indeed, with the WTO dispute settlement process as well. 2
Under Chapter 19 of the NAFrA, panelists are chosen for their
objectivity, reliability, sound judgment, and knowledge of trade law and
are required to be of good character, high standing, and repute. 3 They
are obligated to adhere to codes of conduct and to act impartially and in
their best judgment, untainted by prejudice. I know of no case where
this has not been so. In fact, NAFTA panel decisions are so thorough
and so carefully reasoned that they add enormously to the credibility of
the system as well as to the corpus of international trade law in general.
In the Lumber III panel reviewing the Department of Commerce's
determination of subsidies, accepting in full the good faith, high expertise, and professionalism of all the panelists, there was a problem: the
panel split on national lines, with the three Canadian panelists finding
that the Department of Commerce incorrectly applied U.S. law - or, in
legal terminology - reached conclusions on the countervailability of
Canadian stumpage programs that were "not supported by substantial
evidence on the record."' 4 The two U.S. panelists dissented and would
MOU, effective October 3, 1991.
9 Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products
from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 (1992).
0 The one to be examined here is the panel decision on the Commerce Department's determination of subsidization: In the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada,
USA-92-1904-01, Decision of the Panel on Remand, Dec. 17, 1993. The majority (the three Canadian panelists) rejected the Commerce Department finding and instructed the Department on remand to find that both stumpage programs and log export restrictions were not countervailable
because the record did not establish that these measures were specific in terms of U.S. law.
" In the Matter of Certain Softwood Products from Canada, ECC-94-1904-01 USA; Memorandum Opinions and Order, 3 Aug. 1994.
2 Judge Wilkey's dissent is a scathing criticism of the panel majority's decision. At one
point, he states, ". . . I believe this Binational Panel Majority opinion may violate more principles of appellate review than any opinion by a reviewing body which I have ever read," loc. cit.
(U.S. Cir. Judge (Ret.) Wilkey, M., dissenting, at 37).
'" See NAFIA Annex 1901.2(1).
'4 In the Matter of Certain Softwood Productsfrom Canada, supra note
11, at 65.
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have upheld the Commerce Department's finding.
While the lawyers' debate over the rightness or wrongness of the
majority's finding goes on, to the lay observer it might reasonably appear that the NAFTA system had allowed three Canadians to tell the
U.S. government how to apply its own laws in a matter involving Canadian interests. Even accepting that the Lumber III majority was entirely
right in making such a finding, the result was bound to be seen as just
plain wrong in the eyes of many Americans. It must be accepted that if
the opposite had occurred and three American panelists had out-voted a
minority of Canadians, the effect would have been similar in Canada.
The case has left an unfortunate legacy, the implications of which are
only now being fully felt.
It is the thesis of this Article that Judge Wilkey's dissent was a
watershed and that whether it was the source or simply the articulation
of concern, from that dissent seems to flow much of the current U.S.
dissatisfaction with the NAFTA panel system and with international
dispute settlement generally. As a result of that case, the record shows
many Americans seriously questioning the legitimacy of the NAFTA
panel system.'" Reference has been made to the "fragility" and "low
level" of public confidence in the panel process in the United States.' 6
Strong expressions of concern and dissatisfaction have been voiced in
the U.S. Congress by seasoned and influential members about the threat
of the NAFTA dispute settlement to U.S. sovereignty.' 7 In recent
months, political opposition to both the NAFTA and the WTO panel
systems seems to have escalated. Several U.S. senators have threatened
to block any renewed Fast Track authority for the President to negotiate
NAFTA accession for Chile resulting from, among other reasons, dissatisfaction with the outcome of the NAFTA panel on Canadian agricultur-

, See, e.g., R.E. Burke & B.F. Walsh, NAFTA Panel Review: Should it be Continued,
Eliminated or Substantially Changed? 20 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 529 (1995).
'6 Id. at 559.
,7 See Lawmakers Blast Canada Lumber Ruling, Urge Solution to Flaws in Panel System, 11

INT. T. REP. 1308 (Aug. 24, 1994). On May 4, 1995, a coalition of major U.S. companies and
industry associations sent a letter to U.S. congressional leaders urging that the Chapter 19 process be eliminated or, at the very least, not extended to other NAFTA parties, pointing to the
Softwood Lumber case as an example of how panels allegedly exceed their mandate and arguing
that the system offends the U.S. constitution. See also Industry Coalition Urges Elimination of
Chapter 19 in Letter to Lawmakers, 12 INr. TEL REP. 814 (May 10, 1995). Much of this same

U.S. concern over the effect of international dispute resolution mechanisms was targeted to the
W O Agreement and its Dispute Settlement Understanding. To gain Congressional approval, sections 122-125 of the U.S. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, HR 5110 (103rd Congress, 2d Sess.,
House Doc. 103-316, Vol. 1), provides for continued oversight and review of WTO panel deci-

sions and possible U.S. withdrawal from the WTO on joint resolution of the Congress.
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al tariffs.' 8

This same negative attitude toward international dispute settlement
has been sharpened recently in the dispute over the so-called HelmsBurton Act,' 9 particularly Title I thereof, which allows persons in the

United States to bring civil actions against other parties for acts outside
the United States that are alleged to constitute "trafficking" in confiscated Cuban property." Because of its extra-territorial reach (making actions that are legal in other jurisdictions and that occur outside the United States subject to law suits in the United States), the Helms-Burton

Act has become a major international trade issue, seriously separating
Canada and the European Union, on the one hand, from the United
States, on the other.
The European Union, with Canadian support, has invoked the dispute settlement procedures under the WTO Agreement to challenge the
Act.2' At the same time as the European Union officially commenced
WTO proceedings, officials of the Clinton administration warned that the

E.U. action was strengthening arguments of Congressional opponents of
open trade and global cooperation through the WTO, who say the body
threatens U.S. sovereignty.' In a serious departure from accepted international practice, the United States has refused to cooperate in the naming of a WTO panel, forcing the WTO Secretary General to name the
appointment on its behalf. The U.S. government then announced that it

" In the Matter of Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products,
CDA-95-2008-01, Final Report of the Panel, Dec. 2, 1996. The U.S. dairy and poultry industry
spokespersons expressed predictable outrage at the decision claiming that the "Canadians have
found a way to wiggle off the hook," FIN. PosT (Toronto), Dec. 4, 1996. Secretary of Agriculture Glickman stated that the panel decision was wrong. TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL Jan. 16, 1997
(notwithstanding that it was a unanimous decision, including the two U.S. panelists). The battle
over renewed Fast Track authority between the Administration and the Congress involves many
of the same Congressional interests that refuse to accept the result of the NAFTA panel decision.
Clinton Fights Free Trade Foes, FIN. POST (Toronto), Mar. 6, 1997.
'9 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)Act of 1996, 19 USCA § 6081.
" Under section 306 of the Act, the President has the authority to suspend Title In for periods of six months where he determines that "such suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba." The President
exercised this suspension authority three times since the passage of the law, the latest being on
July 16, 1997. 14 INT'L TRADE REP. 1317 (July 30, 1997).
2 Canada has intervenor status in the WTO complainL It had stated earlier that it would
have initiated separate proceedings against the Helms-Burton legislation under Chapter 20 of the
NAFTA, but announced that it would put this in suspension pending the outcome of the U.S.E.U. dispute in the WTO and, in particular, whether the parties are able to reach some settlement. Canada Delays NAFTA Helms-Burton Case Pending E.U. Negotiations with United States,
14 INT. TR. REP. 307 (Feb. 19, 1997). In light of recent developments, it appears that a U.S.E.U. settlement is only a distant possibility.
2' E.U. Unites Against Anti-Cuba Law, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 17, 1997.
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would boycott the WTO panel proceedings and not accept the result of
any findings.' The Helms-Burton Act has put the WTO and the
NAFTA dispute settlement process under extreme pressure.'
Returning to the Softwood Lumber case - the latest chapter, Lumber IV - has been settled by means of another Memorandum of Understanding that, among other things, caps Canadian exports in terms of
volume through use of quotas, enforced through an export tax system'ss
Part of the leverage behind the conclusion of this agreement was the
fact that, in implementing the Uruguay Round, U.S. law was changed to
make it easier for the Department of Commerce to determine the existence of a countervailable subsidy on the basis of de facto specificity.?

The Clinton administration made it a term of the political settlement that
it would not initiate a threatened trade action under Section 301 of the
Trade Act of 1974 and Canada insisted that the U.S. lumber producers
withdraw their constitutional challenge and not file a further countervail-

ing duty petition.
Notwithstanding that agreement, a new constitutional challenge has

been initiated by another American interest group, aiming to strike down
U.S. adherence to the NAFTA panel system. The case was filed in
January 1997 in the U.S. Court of Appeals by a group called the American Coalition for Competitive Trade. 2 As with the U.S. lumber
producers' earlier challenge, the essence of the claim is that by ratifying

U.S. Says WTO Panel Not Competent to Judge Cuba Dispute, Hopes To Settle, 14 INT.
TR. REP., 351 (Feb. 26, 1997); WTO Natr.es Panel to Review E.U.-U.S. Dispute, TORONTO
GLOBE & MAIL (Feb. 21, 1997).
2 It is not the purpose of this Article to delve into the issues surrounding the Canadian and
E.U. challenges over the international legality of the Helms-Burton Act. It is important to note,
however, that at issue is the extent of the national security exception under Article XXI of the
GATT and Article 2102 of the NAFrA. The U.S. position is that these provisions recognize the
right of any State to take actions that "it considers necessary for the protection of its national
security interests ...
taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations:'
2' Office of the United States Trade Representative, press release, 96-17, Feb. 16, 1996.
Under the pre-existing version of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1677)
and the Department of Commerce's own Regulations (54 Fed. Reg. 23379) as interpreted by the
courts, the Commerce Department was required to find the existence of all four factors specified
in section 771(5). The amendments in the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (URAA) now require
only one of four factors to exist in order in order for a foreign government program to be specific and hence countervailable. As provided in section 251 of the URAA, "(iii) Where there are
reasons to believe that a subsidy may be specific as a matter of fact, the subsidy is specific if
one or more of the following factors exist... :t (emphasis added).
" Complaint and Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Civil Action No. 97-1036, filed January
16, 1997. A previous constitutional challenge has been initiated by a group calling itself the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (Complaint and Petition for Review for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Civil Action 94-1627, filed on 14 September 1994), but this action was withdrawn
on the basis of the settlement reached in Lumber IV.
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and applying Chapter 19 of the NAFTA, the U.S. Congress and the
President unlawfully ceded judicial power to a non-American body that,
under the U.S. constitution, exclusively resides in U.S. domestic courts.
Whether directly or indirectly related to the Softwood Lumber case,
the constitutional challenge to U.S. adherence to the NAFTA panel
system is indeed worrisome and it cannot be excluded that this case
may achieve some success in the U.S. courts. At the point of writing, it
is not clear when the first round of written arguments will be filed and
when the case will be heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals. Final disposition of the case by that Court is many months away and it can be
expected that it will ultimately go to the U.S. Supreme Court. The potential significance of this case, notwithstanding limited media attention,
should not be under-estimated. The submissions will be decided on
purely U.S. constitutional law considerations and not on foreign relations
or trade policy grounds. It is impossible to know how U.S. courts will
deal with the issues, but it would be a mistake to assume that the
NAFTA panel system is home-free.
Should this challenge succeed, the effects on the NAFTA would be
devastating. The Chapter 19 process has been an integral part of the
deal consummating both the FTA and the NAFTA from Canada's standpoint. Mexico, too, accepted the NAFTA package with Chapter 19 as an
integral part of the compromise. Should the U.S. courts find the panel
system to be ultra vires the U.S. constitution, the entire NAFTA edifice
will likely crumble. Without the ability to legally implement Chapter 19,
the United States would be in fundamental breach of its treaty obligations. The Canadian government would almost certainly face relentless
pressure to withdraw from the treaty under Article 2205.
When standing back and considering the "broad strokes" of NAFTA
from a legal perspective, then one of the chief concerns relates to the
political and legal pressures on the Chapter 19 process from within the
United States. As noted above, there is a growing view among elements
in U.S. political leadership that holds that treaties, such as the WTO and
the NAFTA, that limit U.S. freedom of action through a process of
third-party adjudication cannot be tolerated. This concern was the motivation behind legislation introduced by then-Senator Bob Dole that
would have established a WTO dispute settlement review commission to
review all adverse WTO panel decisions which could have ultimately
led to U.S. withdrawal from the WTO itself.' For the United States to

' S.1438, 104th Cong. (1996).
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be forced into a process of external adjudication is seen by this constituency as not being consistent with U.S. sovereignty and national values,
notwithstanding that by their very nature, treaty engagements limit state

sovereignty to a greater or lesser degree.
At the risk of sounding self-righteous (and apologizing in advance
for it) one does not find the comparable attitude, or at least not to the

same extent, in Canada. The recent WTO periodicals case 9 is an example. While Canada appears to have lost on most of the issues before the
panel, and while there has been extensive public comment and discussion about its implications for Canadian cultural policies,' the reaction

has been one of internal examination as opposed to condemnation of the
panel process itself. None of the comments in the media suggested that
the WTO process was offensive or that Canada should reconsider its

position in that body.3 This reaction, of course, illustrates the position
of a smaller power. Conversely, comparing the two situations also shows

that a large and powerful nation, with vast resources and unrivaled economic might, does not take lightly to losing in third-party dispute settlement. Whatever the explanation, the apparently hostile attitude in some
quarters in the United States to the legitimacy of NAFTA (and WTO)
dispute settlement processes is a cause for concern.
B. Some Suggestions - A Permanent NAFTA Panel System
One of the defects of the NAFTA as a free trade agreement is the
lack of a permanent core and the absence of a centralizing body, in the
sense of the executive institutions of the European Union in Brussels
and the European Court of Justice and European Parliament in
Strasbourg.3 While this is possibly a heretical proposition in the pres-

' See Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, complaint by the United States
(WTIDS31). The panel's interim findings have not been made public at the time of writing, but
have been an issue to the two governments. However, the findings of the panel have been
leaked and are widely available. INSIDE U.S. TtADE, Jan. 24, 1997.
" See Overhaul Cultural Strategy: Eggleton, FIN. POST (Toronto), Jan. 28, 1997; Culture
Protection Debate Heats Up, FIN. POST (Toronto), Jan. 29, 1997; Culture Not Safe Under
NAFTA, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 29, 1997; Barshefsky Sees Magazine Ruling As Trade
Weapon, TORONTO GLOBE & MAn, Jan. 30, 1997.
"' This is not to say that the reaction in Canada was benign. While there appeared to be an
absence of WTO-bashing in public comments, there has been strong condemnation of U.S. policy
toward Canada by politicians and media representatives. Copps Sets Stage for War Over Culture,
TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 11, 1997.
" It is accepted that NAFTA Article 2001 creates the Free Trade Commission, theoretically
charged with the supervision of the implementation of the Agreement and the overseeing of its
further elaboration. As well, Article 2002 creates a secretariat, composed of national sections. In
reality, these bodies are no more than a periodic meeting of the respective ministers of intema-
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ent Canada-U.S. climate and goes against the grain of the current politics in Washington, there is, in this writer's view, value in considering
an element of permanency in the Chapter 19 and Chapter 20 panels as a
means of restoring some of that very faith in the dispute settlement
process that seems of have been dissipated in the wake of the Softwood
Lumber case.
Consider how the panels function under the NAFTA. Under Chapter
19 (as well as under Chapter 20), the panel system is purely ad hoc.
Panels are appointed from the roster under Article 1904 for a particular
case. Once that case ends, they return to private law practice or their
other calings 3 Even during the life of a panel, the five panelists meet
as a group only infrequently and often not before the hearing day itself.
Following the hearing, much of the panel's deliberations are by means
of telephone conference calls and long-distance exchanges of drafts of
their report.34 There is no permanent clerking system or legal assistance
available to the panel itself. Rather, individual panelists bring with them
junior members of their law firms, students, or other research assistants
as might be available. While these persons perform a necessary and
valuable service, the absence of permanent assistants and a legal research staff reinforces the inherently transitory nature of the process.
The same criticisms apply to Chapter 20 panels, whose operations parallel those of Chapter 19.
Hence, unlike an appellate court, there is no institutional longevity
in any meaningful sense in the NAFTA. While prior panel decisions
offer guiding jurisprudence which helps to bind the system, this cannot
really substitute for the benefits of a permanent institution in terms of
continuity and in ensuring a kind of central core to the Agreement.
It is appreciated that permanency will not alleviate all of the dissatisfaction flowing out of the United States. But it could meet some of
the concerns leveled at the panel process by Judge Wilkey in the Softwood Lumber case who stated, among other things, that because FTA
(and now NAFTA) panels are comprised of private practitioners in the
trade law field who come from and return to practice at the end of their

tional trade and their officials. They are not akin to the institutions established under the Treaty
of Rome. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission exercises in reality no independent enforcement,
supervisory, or executive powers.
" NAFTA Annex 1901.2.
34 The NAFIA Article 1904 Panel Rules, adopted by Canada, the United States, and Mexico
pursuant to Article 1904.14 of the Agreement, do not deal in any detail with the internal functioning of panels, allowing each individual panel to adopt its own internal procedures. But the
point is that inherent in the Chapter 19 system is that panels are both ad hoc and each panel
will be composed of completely different members. The same factors apply in Chapter 20 panels.
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duties, they have a psychological disposition not to show deference to
the administrative agency whose decision is under review.' While
many of Judge Wilkey's immediate criticisms may not be met by a permanent tribunal - which he would no doubt find as abhorrent to U.S.
sovereignty as the present ad hoc system - it is submitted that a permanent system would be of considerable, longer-term value. It would
help smooth out some of the aberrations in panel decisions under the
present regime and ensure an element of consistency and continuity that
is lacking.'
The politics of North American trade and the various interests at
play clearly make it impossible to renegotiate the NAFTA to establish
central treaty bodies such as those under the Treaty of Rome. There are,
moreover, difficult issues of national sovereignty that prevent the creation of full-fledged trilateral institutions. The Treaty of Rome was a
product of a purely European experience following World War II which
cannot be transposed to the North American context. On the legal level,
the NAFTA is not, as is the case of the European Union, a customs
union with a common external tariff and common trade policy. Finally,
the NAFTA functions extremely well as a free trade agreement and
there is no cause to create new institutions where none are called for.
In the case of the NAFTA panels, however, it would seem that
some form of permanency would help to ensure consistency in jurisprudence and, at the same time, create at least one central body with an
ongoing, vested interest in the NAFTA system at large, as opposed to
national secretariats each with a particular point of view and ad hoc
panels whose members meet, decide, and then disappear back into their
respective callings, never to meet again.
There is a modest precedent for such a permanent body - the
International Joint Commission (IJC), created under the 1909 Boundary
Waters Treaty.37 While not a perfect precedent, the UC does have a
permanent staff and its own offices and, importantly, has plenary jurisdiction over the use, obstruction, or diversion of waters flowing between
Canada and the United States. While it has separate Canadian and

See dissenting opinion of Judge Wilkey, supra note 12.
Interestingly, the U.S. industry coalition advocating the elimination of Chapter 19, referred
to earlier, also criticized the system as being "ad hoc and fragmented." 12 INT'L TRADE REP.,
3'

814.
U.S.T.S. 548; 1910 Br. Tr. Series 23. See also Canada-United States Great Lakes Water
Quality Agreement, 1978 Can.T.S. No. 20; 30 U.S.T.S. 1383, giving additional powers to the
Commission in respect of the environmental monitoring of the Great Lakes basin system.
3' See Boundary Waters Treaty, Article VIII. S. Wex, The Legal Status of the International
Joint Commission under International and Municipal Law, XVI CAN. Y.B. INT'L. L., 276; THE
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U.S. sections, it has plenary jurisdiction as a full commission over the
matters conferred on it by the Treaty. While politics are not absent from
its decision-making, it has a juridical independence from governments
and an independent role in applying the treaty regime.
Thus, as a modest but practical suggestion, it is proposed that in the
one case of Chapter 19 and 20 panels there be a permanent NAFTA
body, with members appointed on tenure for a fixed term, that would
function without regard for or reference to national interests. This, it is
submitted, would help fill a central vacuum and provide an ongoing
element of treaty coherence. In the longer term, this very permanency
would lead to restoration in the faith of the NAFTA panel system as a
treaty institution.
1I.

THE OPERATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN TRADE REMEDIES SYSTEM ANTI-DUMPING AS A CASE IN POINT

The second issue to examine in the context of "broad strokes" is the
operation of anti-dumping processes in Canada and the United States
(not forgetting Mexico). One of Canada's chief objectives going back to
the FrA negotiations was to reach agreement with the United States on
a common set of remedial measures and disciplines to be applied bilaterally on the use of subsidies and countervailing measures and on the
use of dumping remedies in Canada-U.S. trade.39
In terms of dumping, the core consideration for Canada was that, as
an export-oriented country, it faced uncertainties (some said harassment)
through the litigious use of anti-dumping petitions by U.S. industries.'
Indeed, the setting for the FTA negotiations in 1985-1988 was a period
when several major trade cases had been initiated in the United States
involving major Canadian sectors, including the softwood lumber industry in the case already referred to.4' The theory embraced by Canadian

INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION SEVENTY YEARS ON, (R. Spencer, et al. eds.(1981)).
" For a review of the background and the details of the deal-making that lead to the conclusion of the FTA and the Canadian concern over American "contingency protection," see M.
HART, W. DYMOND & C. ROBERTSON, DECISION AT MIDNIGHT, 192-94 (1994).
'o See K.R. Button, The United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement: An Overview and An

Assessment for the U.S. Non-Ferrous Metals and Forest Products Industries, 20 LAw & POL'Y
IN INT'L. Bus, 765 (1988-89).
"' Together with the softwood lumber investigation in 1986, countervailing duty cases were
launched against Canadian exports of groundfish and of live swine and pork products, resulting
in findings of material injury in each case: Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination;
Live Swine and Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork Products from Canada (C-122-404), Vol 50 Fed.
Reg. 25097 (June 17, 1985); Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination; Certain Fresh
Atlantic Groundfish from Canada (C-122-507), Vol 51 Fed. Reg. 10041 (March 24, 1986).
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negotiators was that, as tariffs progressively went to zero and the Canada-U.S. border notionally diminished in importance, the use of anti-

dumping remedies to counter less-than-cost or less-than-home-market
pricing (i.e., pricing below normal value) was more appropriately dealt

with through competition law enforcement.'
It is not the purpose of this Article to review the history or the
merits of this debate. Suffice it to say that, largely due to difficulties
raised by the U.S. side, the FIA working group that was created to
examine a possible replacement regime for dumping remedies got nowhere. For the same reason, the successor working group under NAFTA
Article 1504 made little progress.
In the meantime, over the 1985-1997 period, Commerce Department
investigative procedures under its Regulations" in combination with
changes to the Tariff Act of 19305 brought about through the Uruguay
Round amendments' have turned a dumping investigation into a process that is, for any caught up in it, an ordeal of major proportions,

more onerous thaif the most scrupulous corporate audit and more burdensome than the most exacting securities commission reporting require-

'

There have been many articles and publications on this theoretical debate. Some of the

arguments in this respect are found in T.M. BODDEZ & MJ. TREBILCOCK, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAws IN NORTH AMEuCA (1993); M. J. TREBiLcocK AND R. C.
YORK, FAIR EXCHANGE: REFORMING TRADE REMEDY LAwS (1990); P. L. Warner, Canada-United
States Free Trade: The Case for Replacing Anti-Dumping with Anti-Trust, 23 LAW & POL'Y. IN
INT'L. BUS., 791 (1991-92).
4' Article 1504 of the NAFTA established a Working Group on Trade and Competition. The
mandate of that Working Group was "to report, and to make recommendations of further work,
as appropriate [to the NAFTA government within five years]..
on relevant issues concerning
the relationship between competition laws and policies in the free trade area." Work on this subject proceeded sporadically following the NAFTA entering into force. While an interim report
was to be ready by December 31, 1995, this was delayed because of U.S. government shutdowns due to budgetary problems and intrinsic philosophical differences of approach. When finally produced, the report did nothing concrete in terms of proposing common measures that could
be eventually adopted by the NAFIA governments on competition law remedies in the NAFTA
area to cover unfair pricing issues. Interim Report of the NAFTA 1504 Working Group to the
NAFTA Commission, December 1996. The reason for not making further progress in this area has
been attributed to the reluctance of the U.S. government to make any changes to its anti-dumping laws, regulations, or policies. NAFTA Talks Yield Little, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 18,
1996. Interestingly, while not much of substance has come from the NAFTA working group, the
WTO ministerial meeting in Singapore, Dec. 9-13, 1996, created its own working group on trade
& competition policy. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Press Release, WT/MTN (96)
DECIW, Dec. 13, 1996 (96-5315).
4 19 CFR Parts 351, 353 & 355; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
19 U.S.C. 1673, 1675, as amended.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 26.
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ments. It is open to question whether this onerous application the rules
of the GATT and the 1994 WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement is either fair
or reasonable.
These aspects of the U.S. system affected the Canadian steel industry in a direct way as a result of its being caught up as respondents in
the 1993 flat-rolled steel cases.47 The problems, from the industry's
viewpoint, were compounded by the fact that: (a) there was no reasonable possibility of the Canadian and U.S. (and Mexican) governments
reaching agreement on a replacement regime for, or a moderation of, the
use of anti-dumping remedies under the NAFTA; and (b) the Canadian
anti-dumping laws, regulations, and policies were much less exacting
than those in the United States when it came to investigations or reinvestigations of U.S. steel producers in Canadian dumping cases. The
imbalance in this regard was aptly described by F.H. Telmer, Chairman
of Stelco, in a speech in Toronto in February of 1996.'
As a result of industry pressure, not only from the Canadian steel
producers but from other sources, the Canadian government has tightened up the administration of its anti-dumping laws to a major degree,
requiring strict compliance with deadlines and with the required format
and content for submission of information and, as in the U.S. system,
severely penalizing responding companies for non-compliance, even
where the defects are of a technical nature.49 Among the recent policy
changes are the following:
o Requests for information from exporters will require data on all
domestic sales, not just domestic sales of a comparable volume as sales
to Canada in the period of investigation;
o Failure to respond within the strict deadline for submission will
result in use of best available information;
o
Non-submission of an exact non-confidential version of the document, within the same deadline, replicating the confidential RFI pageby-page, will render the entire submission invalid;
o
Failure to have material ready in the precise format and type as

47 Certain Flat-Rolled Carbon Steel Products from Argentina, et al., Investigation Nos. 731TA-573-579, 581-592, 594-597, 599-609 & 612-619 (Final), USITC Publication 2664, Aug. 1993.
4' Free Trade a Myth, Stelco CEO Says, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 23, 1996; Telmer:
Get Tough Canada, FIN. POST (Toronto), Feb. 23, 1996.
'7 This change in conduct and administration of SIMA investigations is embodied in Revenue Canada's more detailed requests for information (RFIs) and the policy regarding submission
of competed RFIs, formulated in late 1996 and modeled largely on the format used by the U.S.
Commerce Department. See Annex A, in LAWRENCE L. HERMAN, CANADIAN TRADE REMEDY
LAW & PRACnE (1997).
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requested for verification by Revenue Canada officers will lead to rejection of the entire submission.
All of the foregoing changes are designed to render the Canadian investigatory process under SIMA on a par with that in the United States.
The rigours of this approach have been borne head-on by U.S. steel
producers and exporters in the ongoing re-investigations in Cold-Rolled
Steel Sheet" and Corrosion-Resistant(Galvanized) Steel Sheet.5
The purpose of this Article is not to examine the detailed ingredients of the anti-dumping systems of Canada and the United States. Rather, the above illustrates some facts of Canada-U.S. trade relations, and
intra-NAFTA trade at large, that have emerged over the last number of
years. First, deployment on anti-dumping actions in each country against
the goods of the other under the FTA and NAFTA regimes in the period from 1988 to date have continued unabated.52 Second, the system
has become both entrenched and exceedingly complex, partly due to the
degree to which home market sales and production costs are scrutinized
by both the Commerce Department and Revenue Canada. Finally, because of the integration of the U.S. and Canadian economies under the
NAFTA, and because of concern expressed by domestic industries in
Canada, the system in Canada is following more and more of the onerous aspects of the U.S. system. This fact will inevitably make any modifications more difficult to accomplish and, in the eyes of some, has
simply ratcheted-up North American trade to a higher level of protectionism.
ll. WHERE FROM HERE? SOMETMNG LESS THAN FULL-SCALE REPLACEMEN

Accepting that development of a replacement regime for anti-dumping remedies is not legally or politically feasible in the near term, can
something less radical be considered among the parties? If the objective
of the NAFTA is to promote the free flow of goods, is there a possibility of mitigating the undue harshness of the anti-dumping rules, while at
the same time accepting the political reality that there are strong forces
" Revenue
from Germany,
51 Revenue
Sheet Products

Canada, Final Determination of Dumping of Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Sheet
et al., June 29, 1993 (4258-89; AD/998).
Canada, Final Determination of Dumping of Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel
from Australia, et al., June 29, 1994 (4258-93; AD/1014).

52 See The Review of the Special Import Measures Act: A Background Paper, FIN. CAN. 8,

May 1996, prepared for the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Trade Disputes which examined
Canada's Special Import Measures Act in the fall of 1996.
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at work to preserve them?
One possible approach in intra-NAFTA trade would be to allow for
a "defense" to a dumping complaint where it can be demonstrated that
export pricing has been a legitimate, market-based response to North
American business factors. This would recognize the fact of economic
integration brought about by the NAFTA and that pricing of goods is
often determined by market forces and have nothing to do with "unfair"
or predatory-type behavior on the part of the producers. This is particularly true in commodities trade and in primary manufacturing where it is
the free play of the business cycle that determines pricing. 3
A. Less-Than-Domestic-PriceDumping
One of the two categories of dumping under GATT Article VI and
the Anti-Dumping Agreement is where the exporters sell goods at a
price in the import market that is less than the price of same goods are
sold in the ordinary course of trade to the same level of purchasers in
the home market. This less-than-domestic-price dumping is a typical
case that comes before Canadian and U.S. investigators.
There are theoretical arguments that question whether international
price discrimination is a bad thing, given that it is the exporter's market
that bears the brunt of the higher-priced product and, correspondingly,
the importer's market that gains the benefit of the lower-priced good. 4
An additional argument against dumping laws is that theoretically such
dumping should not occur - or at least should not occur over an extended period sufficient to cause injury in the import market. In the
NAFTA context, the trans-border flow through the open market should
ultimately prevent the long-term continuation of any such cross-border
discriminatory pricing. The return of the low-priced product to the
exporter's market through international arbitrage will force price reductions in that market and eliminate the pricing differentials."
However, economic models often betray commercial reality. In the
normal course of business it often transpires that goods are sold in

" There have been various proposals made to moderate the rigourous and overly technical
impact of dumping remedies by "filtering" out the bona fide cases, without necessarily doing
away with the entire system. See, e.g., M. Bronckers, Rehabilitating Anti-Dumping and Other
Trade Remedies Through Cost-Benefit Analyses, 30 J. World Trade L. 5 (1996).
s' See M. TREBILCOCK & R. HowsE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 112-22
(1996).
"s Id. at 114. See also B. Hindley & P. Messerlin, Anti-dumping Industrial Policy: Legalized
Protectionism in the WTO and What To Do About It, unpublished manuscript, Sep. 1996, prepared for the Centre for International Studies, Toronto.
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Canada or in the United States at a price that is less than the price
charged by that exporter in its home market and these goods do not
find their way back to that exporter's market. This is due to a variety of
factors related to the patterns of trade and distribution channels and not
necessarily due to market segmentation. Often, goods imported at lessthan-domestic prices in the exporter's market are re-sold into the distribution chain in the import market and on-sold to lower trade levels,
without being available for purchase and re-sale back into the exporter's
market, so a theoretical price equilibrium is never established. Where
less-than-domestic-price importing occurs with enough regularity to cause
lost sales or downward price effects in the import market, the effects
may lead to a legitimate complaint and subsequent investigation by
national trade agencies, notwithstanding the theoretical possibility that
such pricing must eventually cease due to the effects of arbitrage.
Given that short-term, market-driven pricing may entail technical
dumping and expose an exporter to the full harshness of the investigative regime, the question arises whether it is possible to devise a means
of allowing consideration of such market-driven pricing factors as a
legitimate counter to a dumping complaint. One of the possible avenues
could be to allow a "defense" to a complaint where pricing in the export market is to merely meet the competition in that market, is not
predatory in nature (as that term is understood in competition law), and
does not entail acts designed to injure or eliminate competition.56
This would be akin to permitted defenses in the competition law
area. In U.S. anti-trust law, a claim of price discrimination can be rebutted by a seller demonstrating that the lower price "was made in good
faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or
facilities furnished by a competitor." Under section 50(1)(c) of the
Canadian Competition Act, it is an offense to engage in such pricing i.e., selling at prices in one part of the Canadian market less than prices
sold in another - where such person "engages in a policy of selling
products at prices unreasonably low, having the effect or tendency of
substantially lessening competition or eliminating a competitor, or designed to have such effect."' To constitute an offense, all elements
must be present. In other words, there must be: (a) a policy; (b) goods

' This idea has, of course, been mooted before now. Others have suggested that anti-dumping laws only apply where there is evidence of acts that are aimed at wiping out competition.
D. Palmeter, A Commentary on the WTO Anti-Dumping Code, 30 J. OF WORLD TRADE L. 43,

68 (1996).
15 U.S.C. §13(b).
m R.S.C., ch. C-34 (1985), amended by section 50(1)(c).
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must be sold at unreasonably low prices; (c) the practice or activity
must have the effect of substantially lessening competition or eliminating
a competitor or designed to have such effect. 59
It is not suggested that there be an injection of these identical competition or anti-trust concepts into the dumping laws. Rather, the references to these aspects of Canadian and U.S. competition law are made
to illustrate the point that, in cases where a supplier legitimately responds to North American-wide market conditions and where there is an
absence of evidence of a pattern of actions designed to eliminate competition (borrowing from the "good faith" element of U.S. law), a means
could be devised to put a halt to an anti-dumping investigation. Thus, if
a U.S. exporter supplies a product at the market price in Canada, even
where that price may be less than the comparable price in the United
States, under the appropriate set of conditions, the American exporter
should be allowed to continue to do so, notwithstanding that it is engaging in dumping under the technical interpretation of that term.
The foregoing paragraph makes reference to market-based pricing
and the "the appropriate set of conditions" that would allow a defense
to a dumping complaint to be met. These conditions could be such
things as: (a) "good faith" pricing; (b) an absence of evidence of or a
pattern indicating predation; (c) prevalent market conditions in the export market that require prices to meet the competition in that market;
and (d) an absence of market distortion as a result of such practices. All
of these factors would be a matter of evidence.
The effect of permitting such a defense where these conditions are
established would enhance competition in the import country and allow
customers a wider choice of supplies at the same or substantially the
same price. In addition, it would accord advantages to the import economy based on market efficiencies, by allowing a supply of lower-priced
goods to enter into commerce relative to the economies that were the
source of the higher-priced goods. The exporter's economy, not the
importer's economy, would bear the costs of such inefficiencies. And
finally, a defense as suggested above would curtail the use of dumping
remedies in cases where the pricing is the result of free-market forces.

" A thorough examination of the elements in competition (anti-trust) and dumping laws and
of the possibility of creating a North American regime based on competition principles is also
found in I. R. Feltham et al., Competition (Antitrust) and Anti-dumping Laws in the Context of
the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, 17 CAN-U.S. L. J. 71 (1991) [hereinafter Competition and Anti-dumping Laws].
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B. Less-Than-Cost Dumping
One of the harsher aspects of anti-dumping remedies is the use of
fully absorbed cost methodology for determining home market prices in
cases where price-to-price comparisons are not employed. Requiring
export prices to recover all of the exporters' fully allocated costs means,
by definition, that all fixed and variable costs must be recouped, even
though in standard business practice, from time-to-time, this is not
achievable or necessarily desirable. As a matter of commercial reality,
pricing may not always recover all marginal or variable costs, depending
on where one is in the business cycle.'
As where the exporter engages in good-faith pricing to meet the
competition in the import market but sells at less than comparable prices
in the home market, a similar "defense" to a dumping complaint could
be allowed where the export price is less than the exporter's variablecosts-plus-profit for the same reasons. Looked at another way, given that
the blanket use of fully absorbed-cost-plus-profit methodology in agency
investigations can lead to the application of anti-dumping duties in situations where the business circumstance and the reality of the marketplace
(particularly in cases of a cyclical downturn) make less-than-cost pricing
inevitable, it is suggested that some modification of the remedy is warranted in these circumstances. Where it is shown to have been in response to the North American market factors and provided all relevant
ingredients are carefully tested by a third party, less-than-cost pricing
should not incur dumping penalties.
In such circumstances, the defense would have to show that: (a)
less-than-cost pricing has been of a short-term nature; (b) economic
factors common in the North American market have brought about excess capacity; (c) similar factors pertain in the import market - than is,
that the domestic industry represented by the complainants are facing
similar conditions; and (d) as with U.S. law, the export pricing complained of has been engaged in merely to meet competition, is of good
faith, and is not designed to reduce or eliminate competition in the
market, much like the factors set out above for cases of less-than-do-

6o
In a prosecution under the discriminatory pricing provisions of the Competition Act in R.
v. Consumers Glass Co. [1981] D.L.R. (3d) 274, the Ontario High Court refused to convict the
accused stating that, where the price reductions were "loss minimizing," then the accused was
not selling at unreasonably low prices. Price reductions and sales below average costs were
geared to minimizing losses due to excess capacity. While this was a criminal prosecution under
a different legal regime than the dumping laws, the views of the court are an interesting comment on the relationship between excess capacity, market factors, and pricing decisions.
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mestic-price dumping.6'
C. Consistency With the Anti-Dumping Agreement
Both the foregoing defenses to complaints of less-than-domestic-price
dumping and less-than-cost dumping can readily be adapted to the
framework of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. As already noted,
Article 2.1 of the Agreement sets out the central rule that:
[A] product is to be considered dumped, i.e., introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product
exported from one country to another country is less than the comparable price,
in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country. (emphasis added)

A suggestion is that the NAFTA be changed to provide that, for purposes of Article 2.1 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, pricing in the import
market below domestic prices in the exporter's market, even if "in the
ordinary course of trade," will be accepted as a defense to a trade action
where such prices are for purposes of meeting competition where the
factors suggested above are found to exist.
Alternatively, the term "ordinary course of trade" could be defined
for NAFTA purposes to mean trade in the profitable end of the business
cycle.62 To cover less-than-cost dumping situations, the NAFTA could
be amended so that recourse to constructed costs under Article 2.2 of
the Anti-Dumping Agreement would be excluded under the term "ordinary course of trade" where there is excess capacity in the industry and
a common pattern of below-cost pricing throughout North America as a
result of economic conditions pertaining to that industry.
Thus, where sales are not profitable in both the exporter's and the
importer's markets because of a cyclical downturn and where there is
the North American industry-wide practice of pricing below marginal
cost: (a) such a situation will be deemed not to be "in the ordinary
course of trade"; and (b) recourse to constructed cost methodology under
Article 2.2 would be prohibited. There would be limits placed on the

" These recommendations are offered as a more limited but realizable approach than the
technically complex method of attempting to harmonize competition and antitrust remedies in the
fashion that has been suggested in previous studies. See Feltham et al., Competition and Antidumping Laws, supra note 59.

That is, normally profitable trade in North America in the product at issue, taking into
account all pertinent factors.
62
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use of below-cost pricing as a defense, however, to ensure that only
legitimate counter-arguments are available. As shown above, these additional elements would require the exporter to reasonably demonstrate
that it is not engaging in bad faith behavior designed to lessen competition or to gain undue market advantage, but is rather directed only to
meeting competition in the export market.
There is nothing in the WTO Agreement or the NAFTA that would
prevent the Parties agreeing, inter se, as to how they would apply antidumping remedies. Indeed, the premise of the working group under
Article 1504 of the NAFTA is that agreed changes to the manner in
which these laws are applied would be legal, notwithstanding the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement.
It is worth noting that Article 2.2.1 of the Agreement itself recognizes that below-cost sales occur as a matter of normal business practice
as part of the "ordinary course of trade." Thus, it constrains domestic
agencies from excluding such sales-increasing the normal value and
potentially magnifying the dumping margins - except under certain
carefully defined circumstances, that is, where sales are made within an
extended period of time and in substantial quantities. The point here is
that permitting a defense to a dumping investigation in cases of lessthan-cost dumping is consistent with elements in the Anti-Dumping
Agreement that pay heed to such realities of the market place.
D. ProceduralAspects
There are several ways in which the foregoing measures could be
implemented in procedural terms. None of these would entail radical
surgery to present anti-dumping laws in the NAFTA countries. A miniprocess could quite easily be added to the present domestic laws in
respect of any complaint involving the dumping of goods from a
NAFTA member to determine if any of the defenses suggested above
has merit.6' There are three possible options that could be considered.
One would be to provide that this issue could be the subject of a
hearing by the domestic agencies under current laws at the commencement of an investigation as part of the present preliminary determination
of material injury. Both Canada and the United States have a such a

63 One way would be to describe the process as akin to an "off-ramp," where the parties

would for a brief period of time exit from the road to have the issue determined, while the
same speed is maintained. If the defenses to the action are determined not to be sustainable, the
party initiating the case would regain the road with no loss of speed.
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proceeding under their current laws. In the United States, the process
entails an automatic determination by the United States International
Trade Commission as to whether there is a prima facie case of injury-' Canada requires a party to refer the matter to the Canadian International Trade Tribunal for a preliminary finding. 5 These procedures
could lend themselves to refinement so as to permit a further determination at that same time as to the merit of defenses to an investigation
such as the one outlined above.
A second option would be to establish a separate body (perhaps a
single judge or arbitrator) who would hear the defense at an early stage
in the investigation process and make the appropriate determination. This
would have to be "Fast-tracked," to allow a rapid resolution of the issue
and only a short period of suspension pending the outcome. If the decision on the defense were negative, the proceeding would continue as
before.
An additional option would be to permit this separate kind of "miniproceeding" at the commencement of injury hearing itself. The disadvantage with this option is that it moves the determination to the back
end of the process, where the exporters and importers have already
undergone the investigative burdens already discussed (responding to
detailed questionnaires and undergoing verification audits).
Thought will need to be given as to how the above criteria would
be applied in the case where a NAFTA-based exporter is involved in a
multi-country dumping investigation. An option would be to allow this
issue to be side-tracked for a separate finding, somewhat analogous to
the separate track for judicial reviews of final determinations under the
NAFTA panel system. While this would treat NAFTA goods separately,
such differential treatment is inherent in the present system.
A final point to be considered is whether any of the foregoing
would offend that non-discrimination provisions of GAT1 Article 111:4.
While this may warrant some examination, it would seem that a determination of any such defense would be fully consistent with the
NAFTA itself and with the permitted preferential system inherent in the
free trade area, which itself is permissible under GATT Article XXIV as

- 19 U.S.C. 1673(b). The jurisdiction of the ITC is to make a preliminary determination,
based on the information available to it at the time, whether there is a "reasonable indication" of
material injury or threat thereof to a U.S. industry by reason of the dumped imports.
' Similar to the U.S. situation, a reference to the Tribunal under section 34(1)(b) of SIMA
by one of the parties following the initiation of an investigation requires the Tribunal to determine from the written record whether the evidence discloses a "reasonable indication" that the
alleged dumping has caused or is threatening to cause material injury.
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a deviation from the universality of the WTO regime. As noted, the
very objective of a free trade area is to permit discriminatory or preferential treatment of goods from the treaty parties notwithstanding the
national and most-favoured nation obligations under the WTO Agreement.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the foregoing was to examine some of the broad
strokes of the NAFTA based on different attitudes and perceptions, depending on which side of the Canada-U.S. border one stands. One of
the points of concern is that the NAFTA panel system appears under
attack in the United States and will need careful nurturing in terms of
ensuring its longer-term acceptability. The current challenge in the U.S.
courts regarding the constitutionality of the panel system bears careful
watching and should not be taken for granted. A negative decision that is, a decision striking down U.S. adherence to Chapter 19 - would
devastate the NAFTA and likely lead to its abrogation. While the political current in the United States seems to be decidedly anti-NAFTA at
the present time, it is suggested that a longer-term solution to enhance
the credibility of the system, to avoid unusual or idiosyncratic panel
decisions, and to help fill a vacuum at the centre, would be to change
NAFTA so as to create a permanent NAFTA court with members appointed on tenure for a fixed term.
The second part of the Article reviewed the problems with antidumping. It suggested that the rigours of the present anti-dumping system lead to perverse results that betray the realities of the North American marketplace. These anomalies can be partly ameliorated through a
process that combines some of the permitted defense of the competition
law regimes in Canada and the United States, while at the same time
not completely attempting a replacement regime for the use of antidumping remedies. The thesis is that, if carefully devised, such changes
would maintain the legitimate core of the anti-dumping regime among
the NAFTA parties, while simultaneously ensuring that legitimate defenses to less-than-cost and less-than-domestic-price dumping can be
assessed through an impartial, third-party process.

